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I. INTRODUCTION
At 12:50 a.m. Baghdad time on January 17, 1991, the first attack
aircraft of the coalition forces of 28 nations ranged against Iraq, and the
first cruise missiles from the U.S. battleships Missouri and Wisconsin took
off in coordinated strikes to attack military targets in Baghdad and
throughout Iraq and occupied Kuwait. At about 6:30 Eastern Standard
Time, or about an hour and a half after it began, prime time news viewers
in the United States were able to see and hear the effects of the first
attacks on Baghdad.1 The offensive to liberate Kuwait, authorized by
United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 to start no earlier than
January 15, had begun. Iraq had spurned "one final opportunity, as a
pause of goodwill,"' 2 to leave Kuwait, which it invaded August 2, 1990.
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sored by the Wake, Orange and Durham County Bar Associations at Research Triangle Park, NC,
January 12, 1991. This article was prepared at the end of January 1991, and events may supersede
facts and analysis.
1. These states had contributed ground forces contingents, air forces, or naval vessels, by the
end of January 1991: Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Paki-
stan, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Soviet Union, Spain, Syria, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States, and other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council ("GCC"), Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and
the United Arab Emirates. The GCC, formed in 1981 during the Iran-Iraq War, includes Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia and all other states lining the eastern shore of the Persian Gulf. Charter Establishing
Gulf Cooperation Council, Including Rules of Procedure and Unified Economic Agreement, (signed
May 25, 1981; in force November 11, 1981), reprinted in 26 ILM 1138 (1987); Nassib G. Ziade,
Introductory Note, 26 ILM 1131 (1987), explains the GCC's genesis and development. Richard P.
Johnson, Conquering Fear in the Gulf 115 No 3 Naval Inst Proc 78 (1989) analyzes the GCC in action.
The GCC held a summit meeting in Qatar on December 22-25; its closing statement issued Christ-
mas Day declared that war was the only alternative to peaceful Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. Peter
Hayes, Chronology 1990, 70 Foreign Affairs 206, 232 (1991).
2. UN SC Res 678, UN Doc S/RES/678 (November 29, 1990), reprinted in 1 Dept State
Dispatch 298 (1990). Special Warning No 84, published at 1 p.m. London time on January 12, 1991,
had warned all shipping by Notice to Mariners ("NOTMAR") that unless Iraq complied fully with
Resolution 678, "armed force may be used in the waters bordering .... Iraq and Kuwait and the
Arabian Peninsula, including the Persian Gulf, North Arabian Sea and Red Sea." Defense Mapping
Agency Hydrographic/Topographic Center, No 3 Notice to Mariners 111-1.11 (1991). A similar No-
tice to Airmen ("NOTAM") was sent to all aviation units. Special Warning No 85, published as a
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Operation Desert Shield had become Operation Desert Storm. Just over
forty days and forty nights later, it seemed the war was nearly over.
As of January 31, 1991, the conflict had been primarily an air war,
including coalition attacks on Iraqi command and control centers; chemi-
cal, biological and nuclear weapons production facilities; anti-aircraft mis-
sile and gun positions; air force planes and fields; ballistic missile launcher
sites and mobile missile vehicle and launch sites; and, finally, increasingly
heavy attacks on troop, artillery and tank concentrations, and supply and
transportation centers.3 Naval involvement was minimal, except for
cruise missile launches from battleships, cruisers and submarines and car-
rier aircraft to support land-based air attacks, plus some successful coali-
tion attacks on Iraqi vessels, offshore installations and a Kuwaiti island
held by Iraq.4 The ground war was relatively quiet, except for occasional
artillery duels and rescues of downed pilots from Iraqi territory. Iraq de-
fended against air attacks and responded with launches of Scud medium-
range ballistic missiles against the Israeli cities of Haifa and Tel Aviv, and
Dhahran and Riyadh in Saudi Arabia. Most later Scud attacks were
blunted by U.S.-manned Patriot anti-missile missile batteries. 5 Israel was
not a party to the conflict when Iraq launched Scuds against it. The Scud
attacks were an attempt to draw Israel into the war; yet Israel refrained
from any response, while promising a possible response for the future. 6
Aside from occasional aerial dogfights, artillery barrages, forays of minor
naval vessels, and use of sea mines, some of which drifted as far south as
Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, Iraq's posture was largely defen-
sive as of the end of January. Iraq set Kuwaiti oil facilities ablaze and
released crude oil into the Persian Gulf in the largest oil spill in history
(350 square miles) as an attempt to thwart an amphibious landing; this
was part of the same defensive posture. 7
NOTMAR at 12:30 p.m. London time on January 17, 1991, advised that hostilities had begun and
warned of increased dangers to shipping. Defense Mapping Agency Hydrographic/Topographic
Center No 3 Notice to Mariners 111-1.12 (1991). Again, a similar NOTAM was sent to aviation units.
A stronger NOTAM was sent August 24, warning of dangers to aircraft approaching military forces
but advising that self-defense measures would be implemented so as not to interfere with overflight
rights in international airspace. Both NOTMARs advised of the continuation of the ship intercep-
tion procedures of Special Warning No 80, already in place for enforcing the embargo of Iraq and
Iraqi-held Kuwait. 36 Defense Mapping Agency Hydrographic/Topographic Center, Notice to Marin.
ers I 1.15 (1990). Iraq also issued its own warning to Iran. Notice to Mariners No 3/90. See also
notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
3. George Church, The Battle: So Far, So Good, Time 20, 22-23 (January 28, 1991) (US ed).
4. George Church, A Long Seige Ahead, Time 23 (February 4, 1991) (US ed).
5. Church, A Long Seige Ahead at 21-22 (cited in note 4).
6. Church, The Battle: So Far, So Good at 20, 23 (cited in note 3).
7. Richard Lacayo, A War Against the Earth, Time 32 (February 4, 1991) (US ed); Michael D.
Lemonick, Dead Sea in the Making, Time 40 (February 11, 1991) (US ed).
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These events could invoke a treatise of analysis on the law of armed
conflict;8 selected aspects of the issues raised have been ably covered by
others in this symposium. Yet, major issues remain to be addressed. Ap-
plication of humanitarian law to prisoners of war ("POWs"), the civil
populations, cultural, and other objects will pose major questions: POWs
have been taken; complaints for destruction of non-military structures
have arisen; protected targets, such as hospital ships, have been desig-
nated; and there undoubtedly will be claims concerning protected per-
sons, for example, media representatives. Iraq's indiscriminate use of
inaccurate weapons such as the Scuds, the use of chemical or nuclear
weapons, and the destruction of the environment, will also give rise to
further questions.
A national debate over the legality of a unilateral U.S. military re-
sponse, reminiscent of that over Vietnam, 9 began with the dispatch of
troops to Saudi Arabia. Senator Moynihan's On the Law of Nations has
appeared fortuitously, urging application of the rule of law in foreign pol-
icy. 10 Columnist George Will echoed assertions, going back at least to the
nineteenth century, that international law is a ghost, or a chimera. I
Others, such as Senator Terry Sanford, assumed law could serve as a valid
base and proposed that the United States work through the United Na-
tions to resolve the crisis' 2 or declare unilateral preemptive action.' 3
8. See Agora: The Gulf Crisis in International and Foreign Relations Law, 85 Am J Intl L 63 (1991).
9. See generally Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (Viking Press, 1983).
10. Daniel Moynihan, On the Law of Nations 148 (Harvard U Press, 1990). (Thesis: "A political
culture from which the idea of international law has largely disappeared places its initiatives in jeop-
ardy.") As the dust cover subtitle, A historical and personal account of the role of international law in
foreign policy, would indicate, Senator Moynihan's sometimes anecdotal, conversational and serendipi-
tous, but highly readable, account mixes Congressional policy, national law, executive action and
national diplomacy with international law.
11. George Will, The Perils of "Legality," Newsweek 66 (September 10, 1990) (US ed); see also
John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 12, 127, 141-42, 200-201 (Humanities Press,
1965); Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations 282 (Knopf, 4th ed 1967); Panel, Cuban Quaran-
tine: Implications for the Future, 1963 Proceedings Am Soc Intl L 1, 13, 14 (Remarks of Former Secre-
tary of State Dean Acheson); L. Gordon Crovitz, International Law Can't Substitute for War Against
Saddam, Wall StJ A:A1 (anuary 30, 1991). Senator Moynihan, among many others, would of course
refute this view. See, for example, Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave 25-26, 89-90, 92-95, 97-98, 320-
23 (Columbia U Press, 2d ed 1979); Moynihan at 1-14 (cited in note 10); Oliver Lissitzyn, The Interna.
tional Court of Justice 5-6 (Carnegie Endowment for Intl Peace, 1951); 1 Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States 17-18 (ALl, 1987) ("Restatement (Third)"). As Senator
Moynihan would suggest, the Framers also believed that international law existed in 1787. Moynihan
at 14-20 (cited in note 10); US Const, Art I, S 8, cl 3, 10-11; 5 9, cl 8; S 10, cl 1, 3; Art II, S 2, cl 2;
S 3; Art III, 5 2, cl 2, 3; Art V, cl 2; Amend XIV, S 1.
12. Terry Sanford, No, UN Pressure Will Work Best, New York Times A:29 (August 24, 1990).
See also The North Carolina Lawyers' Persian Gulf Statement of October 23, 1990, cited in John
Healy, Give Sanctions Time to Work, Neal Says on TV, Winston-Salem J 8 (November 29, 1990).
13. Alfonse D'Amato, Yes, Hussein Must Be Ousted, New York Times A:29 (August 24, 1990).
See also Abraham Sofaer, Asking the U.N. Is Asking for Trouble, Wall St J A:14 (November 5, 1990).
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Other voices decried the use of force in any form, at any time, arguing
that Kuwait was not worth the effort, that other nations were not sup-
porting the cost of military operations, or that armed conflict was not the
way to solve the problem. 14 The first cases filed in opposition to the U.S.
force buildup were defeated on political question and ripeness grounds. 15
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 678 reopened a domestic
Constitutional debate on whether the President could commit U.S. forces
to armed conflict without formal approval from Congress. That point
became moot on January 12, when Congress passed a joint resolution
authorizing the use of force. 16 Congress subsequently passed a concur-
rent resolution in support of U.S. armed forces committed to the con-
flict. 17 As evidenced by the joint resolution, the Executive's prewar
policies thereafter coincided with those of Congress and the Security
Council in the crisis.' 8 Nevertheless, a chorus of antiwar protests in the
Congress considered separate resolutions in each house on the use of force before adjournment, but
no resolution passed for Presidential action. See Ange v Bush, 752 F Supp 509, 510-11 (DDC 1990).
14. Michael Kramer, Toward a New Kuwait, Time 26 (December 24, 1990) (US ed); George
Church, Is Uncle Sam Being Suckered?, Time 38 (December 24, 1990) (US ed); Strobe Talbott, America
Abroad: Woodrow Wilson in the Gulf, Time 43 (December 24, 1990) (US ed).
15. See Ange (cited in note 13), which dismissed a National Guardsman's suit on political ques-
tion and ripeness grounds. Dellums v Bush, 752 F Supp 1141 (DDC 1990) (restated the overlapping
powers of Congress and the Executive in the war power area and held that the Congressmen who had
sued did have standing, but the court declined to decide the case, on ripeness grounds).
16. HR 77, Pub L No 102-1, 105 Stat 3 (1991). Resolution 77 was carefully worded and echoed
the tone of the Cuban Missile Crisis resolution, see note 92. Compare the broad-brush force authori-
zation given President Johnson by the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, HR 1145, Pub L No 88-408, 78 Stat
384 (1964), repealed by Pub L No 91-672, S 12, 84 Stat 2053, 2055 (1971). See also Louis Henkin,
Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 108, 351 note 47 (Foundation Press, 1972).
17. S 2, 102nd Cong, 1st Sess, 137 Cong Rec S 963 (January 17, 1991); S 2, 102nd Cong, 1st
Sess, 137 Cong Rec HR 566 (January 18, 1991). The vote was 98-0 in the Senate, 399-6 in the House,
with 6 Congressmen voting "present." See also S 2, 102nd Cong, 1st Sess, 137 Cong Rec S 963-S
972 (January 17, 1991) and HR 566-HR 596 (January 18, 1991).
18. Compare, President George Bush, Address to the Nation, August 8, 1990, 1 Dept State
Dispatch 52 (1990); President Bush, Opening Statement before News Conference, August 22, 1990,
26 No 34 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docs 1281 (August 27, 1990); President Bush, Remarks
at White House Briefing for Members of Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis, August 28, 1990, 26 No
35 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docs 1300 (September 3, 1990); President Bush, Address to
the 45th Session of the U.N. General Assembly, October 1, 1990, 26 No 40 Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Docs 1496 (October 8, 1990); U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, Isolation Strat-
egy Toward Iraq, October 17, 1990, 1 Dept State Dispatch 204 (October 22, 1990) (statement before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee); Secretary Baker, Why America Is in the Gulf, October 29,
1990, 1 Dept State Dispatch 235 (November 5, 1990) (address before the Los Angeles World Affairs
Council); Secretary Baker, Gulf Crisis: At a Crossroads, November 29, 1990, 1 Dept State Dispatch
297 (December 3, 1990) (remarks before the UN Security Council); President Bush, The Gulf: A
World United Against Aggression, November 30, 1990, 1 Dept State Dispatch 295 (December 3,
1990) (opening statement before news conference); Secretary Baker, America's Strategy in the Persian
Gulf Crisis, December 5, 1990, 1 Dept State Dispatch 307 (December 10, 1990) (statement before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee); President Bush, Address to the Nation, 27 No 50 Weekly
Compilation Presidential Docs 50 (january 16, 1991); President Bush, State of the Union Address to
the Congress, 27 No 5 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docs 90 (February 4, 1991).
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United States and European allied countries continued. 19 Other nations,
particularly the European Allied countries, experienced similar types of
upheaval in deciding to support the war.20
This article cannot concentrate on these aspects of armed conflict.
The focus of this article is thus relatively narrow: the legal aspects of
international armed conflict, particularly the actions of the United Na-
tions, during the prewar crisis, August 1, 1990 through January 15, 1991.
The evolution of the conflict and chronology of events during the crisis
demonstrates how the U.N. Security Council has emerged as a potentially
major player in a post-Cold War world, but the U.N. system has yet to be
implemented completely as its founders envisioned it.2 1 There are impor-
tant aspects of international law, totally outside the law of the U.N. Char-
ter ("the Charter"), that also have played a role in this crisis and will
undoubtedly impact future crises as well; these are also considered.
Furthermore, law does not, and cannot, operate in a sterile vacuum;
any decision-maker must confront the role of law in the social order.22
There are other legal norms, some international, some at the national
level, that impacted the crisis before the war and will continue to influ-
ence events. 23
II. CHRONOLOGY OF CRISIS: THE SECURITY
COUNCIL IN ACTION
On August 2, 1990, after the failure of a conference among Arab
states the day before, Iraq invaded Kuwait. This action placed Saudi Ara-
bia in fear of imminent attack.24
19. See Nancy Gibbs, A First Thick Shock of War, Time 34 Uanuary 28, 1991) (US ed); Michael S.
Serrill, Closing Ranks Behind the Yanks; Time 67 (January 28, 1991) (US ed); Gustav Niebuhr, War May
Be Hell, But the Clergy Isn't of One Mind on Iraq, Wall St J A:2 (January 28, 1991). As the war
progressed, however, United States public opinion seemed to approve of the conflict. See generally
Nancy Gibbs, Can the Pro-War Consensus Survive?, Time 32 (February 18, 1991) (US ed); Richard
Zoglin, Just Whose Side Are They On?, Time 52 (February 25, 1991) (US ed).
20. See Serrill, Closing Ranks Behind the Yanks at 67 (cited in note 19).
21. For the early history of the United Nations and its antecedents, see Leland M. Goodrich,
Edvard Hambro and Anne P. Simons, Charter of the United Nations (Columbia U Press, 3d ed 1969);
Ruth B. Russell and Jeannette E. Muther, A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the U.S.
1940-1945 (Brookings Inst, 1958).
22. See Harold D. Lasswell and Myers S. McDougal, Jurisprudence in Policy-Oriented Perspective, 1
U Fla L Rev 486, 487 (1967).
23. See note 12 and accompanying text.
24. Fouad Ajami, The Summer of Arab Discontent, 69 Foreign Affairs 1, 14 (1990). In his survey
of the troubled waters of Arab politics, with its admixture of Islamic beliefs, Ajami states that there
were three incursions into Saudi territory on August 3, 1990. See also Stanley Reed, Jordan and the
Gulf Crisis, 69 Foreign Affairs 21 (1990); Edward L. Morse, The Coming Oil Revolution, 70 Foreign
Affairs 36 (1990) and William B. Quandt, The Middle East in 1990, 69 Foreign Affairs 49 (1991). The
United Kingdom had frustrated an Iraqi attempt to annex Kuwait in 1961; British troops had landed
but eventually were replaced by Egyptian forces. The United Kingdom removed its troops in a
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A. Resolution 660: The Security Council Acts
The Security Council passed Resolution 660, condemning the inva-
sion, demanding Iraqi withdrawal, and calling upon Kuwait and Iraq to
begin immediate intensive negotiations to resolve their differences. The
Security Council supported all negotiation efforts, especially those of the
Arab League, and decided to meet again to consider further steps to en-
sure compliance. 25 Nations such as the United States began unilateral
and collective economic and diplomatic initiatives. The Bush Administra-
tion issued Executive Orders 12722 and 12723 that morning, Washington
time, to block Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets. 26 United States Defense Secretary
Dick Cheney and others began negotiations with Saudi Arabia and other
states for self-defense agreements; the terms of these agreements have not
been published.2 7
Invocation of U.N. Charter Articles 39 and 40 in Chapter VII, Ac-
tion with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and
Acts of Aggression, gave Iraq notice of the seriousness of the situation.
The Security Council had bypassed Chapter VI, Pacific Settlement of Dis-
month-long phased withdrawal several months later. Because of Soviet objection, the Security Coun-
cil debate was inconclusive. James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy 1919-1979 65-66 (St Martin's Press, 2d
ed 1981). The British response in 1961 perhaps explains, at least in part, Iraq's enmity toward U.K.
nationals held hostages in 1990. See also Marjorie M. Whiteman, 5 Digest of International Law 109-13
(1965).
25. UN SC Res 660, UN Doe S/RES/660 (1990), reprinted in 29 ILM 1325 (1990). For a
summary of the debate, see Pre-Dawn Council Meeting, Condemnation, Call for Withdrawal, 27 No 4 UN
Chronicle 9 (1990).
26. Executive Orders 12722-23, 55 Fed Reg 31803-05 (1990). The United States was not alone
in such a rapid response. By September 6, the Secretary-General reported that 106 nations had
reported actions taken to implement sanctions. Most sanctions were imposed pursuant to UN SC
Res 661, UN Doc S/RES/661 (1990), reprinted in 29 ILM 1325 (1990), but some were unilateral
national actions. See Sanctions: 106 Countries Reply, 27 No 4 UN Chronicle 13 (1990).
27. See, for example, Clifford Krauss, After Years of Discreet Trade-Offs U.S. Is Testing the Saudi.%
New York Times A:10 (August 7, 1990). Other GCC members reached agreements with the United
States later in August. Michael R. Gordon, Cheney, On Quick Tour, Reaches Agreements on More Bases
in Gulf, New York Times AA (August 21, 1990). See remarks of President Bush (cited in note 18).
The Case Act, 1 USC S 112b (1988), requires that all agreements other than treaties be transmitted
to Congress within sixty days of coming into force. Failure to do so does not affect an agreement's
validity under international or U.S. law. 1 Restatement (Third) S 312, Reporters' Note 5 (cited in
note 11). Eventually all agreements, except those classified for security reasons, are published in the
United States Treaties and Other Agreements ("UST") series and are indexed in the annual U.S.
Department of State, Treaties in Force. Article 102 of. the U.N. Charter requires registration and
publication of treaties and other international agreements of U.N. members. However, the only pen-
alty for failure to register is that no parry to such treaties or agreements may invoke them before any
U.N. organ, such as the Security Council, the General Assembly, or the International Court of Jus-
tice. The League of Nations Covenant, Article XVIII, was more strict: no unregistered treaty or
agreement "[was] binding until so registered." Thus it is possible that for security reasons the Cheney
agreements will not be available for public scrutiny, although Congress will see them under the Case
Act. A U.S. treaty partner could publish an agreement among its treaties, or could register it with the
United Nations under Article 102.
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putes, which, although speaking of disputes "likely to endanger the main-
tenance of international peace and security," emphasizes resolution by
nonviolent means: negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitra-
tion, judicial settlement, use of regional arrangements, or other peaceful
means of the disputants' choice. 28 The Security Council, in citing Arti-
cles 39 and 40 of the Charter, indicated that it thought there was a
chance for a peaceful resolution. The Council "determine[d]," under Ar-
ticle 39, that a "breach of international peace and security" had occurred
in Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. However, it "[d]emand[ed]" that Iraq leave
Kuwait and "call[ed] upon" Iraq and Kuwait to begin intensive negotia-
tions. In doing so, the Council did not "decide" upon measures to be
taken under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter, an option under Article
39. Rather, the Council "call[ed] upon the parties ... to comply with...
provisional measures (for example, negotiations)." 2 9 Among the range of
possible actions by the Security Council, this was perhaps the mildest
prescription possible under Chapter VII. The Council did not cite, Reso-
lution 3314 Definition of Aggression, passed by the U.N. General Assem-
bly in 1974 by consensus. Referring to Charter Article 39, Resolution
3314 defines aggression and acts of aggression, stating in Article 2 that
"the first use of armed force by a State shall constitute prima facie evi-
dence of an act of aggression," although the Security Council may con-
clude that other relevant circumstances warrant a determination that
such an act did not occur. Article 3(a) declares that invasion or attack by
a state's armed forces on the territory of another state, or any military
occupation, however temporary, resulting from such an invasion or at-
tack, qualifies as an act of aggression. Article 5 declares:
1. No consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic,
military or otherwise, may serve as a justification for aggression.
2. A war of aggression is a crime against international peace. Aggres-
sion gives rise to international responsibility.
3. No territorial acquisition or special advantage resulting from ag-
gression is or shall be recognized as lawful. 30
The Council also did not cite Assembly Resolution 2625, adopting by
consensus the Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations Among States of 1970, which includes pledges to re-
frain from using force, or the threat of force, against the territorial integ-
rity of states; to refrain from depriving peoples of their national identity;
28. Compare Charter of the United Nations [19451 59 Stat 1031, 1 UNTS xvi (in force October
24, 1945) ("UN Charter").
29. Compare UN Charter at Arts 39-40 (cited in note 28) with UN SC Res 660 (cited in note
25).
30. UN GA Res 3314, 29 UN GAOR Supp No 19, UN Doc A/9619 & Corr 1 (1974), reprinted
in 69 Am J Intl L 480 (1975).
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to refrain from intervention in the domestic affairs of a state; and to re-
spect the sovereign equality of states.31
Resolutions 2265 and 3314, like any Assembly resolutions passed
under Charter Articles 10-14, do not impose legal obligations on U.N.
members, 32 but their terms are at least evidence of international law and
may be considered declaratory of the law. 33 Although not cited in Reso-
lution 660, or any subsequent resolution dealing with the Kuwait crisis,
Resolutions 2265 and 3314 may be a significant factor in postwar dispute
resolutions, including war crimes trials.
B. Resolution 661 and Self-Defense
By August 6, 1990, the first of the Cheney agreements were con-
cluded. On the same day, Council Resolution 661, approved pursuant to
Chapter VII of the Charter, ordered an embargo of Iraqi and Kuwaiti
ports, exempting medical supplies from its operation. Resolution 661 also
"[a]ffirm[ed] the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in
response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with
Article 51 of the Charter," and "[d]ecide[d]," in paragraph 9, "that
notwithstanding [the Resolution's embargo provisions], nothing in the
present resolution [would] prohibit assistance to the legitimate Govern-
ment of Kuwait," and called upon states to protect Kuwaiti assets and not
to recognize the regime set up by Iraq. By this time, the Kuwaiti govern-
ment and many Kuwaiti nationals had fled to Saudi Arabia and estab-
lished a government in exile. Resolution 661 also allowed the states to
keep the crisis on the Council's agenda.34
Besides the express affirmation of the right of individual and collec-
tive self-defense, 35 Resolution 661 is important for two reasons: it in-
voked all of Chapter VII, including Articles 41 and 42, and it included a
"decision" by the Security Council to retain the crisis on the Council
agenda. Article 41 permits the Security Council to decide on measures
31. UN GA Res 2625 (1970), reprinted in 9 ILM 1292 (1970).
32. Julius Stone, Hopes and Loopholes in the Definition of Aggression, 71 Am J Intl L 224, 225 (1977).
See also D.W. Bowett, Self-Defense in International Law 249-68 (Manchester U Press, 1958); Ian Brown-
lie, International Law and the Use of Force by States 351-58 (Oxford U Press, 1963); Benjamin B. Fer-
encz, 1 & 2 Defining International Aggression (Oceana Pub, 1975).
33. 1 Restatement (Third) S 103(2)(d), Comment c & Reporters' Note 2 (cited in note 11).
34. UN SC Res 661 (cited in note 26). Eventually 106 states responded to the Council call.
Sanctions: 106 Countries Reply (cited in note 26). Twice before the Council had voted sanctions
against a state, a total economic embargo against Rhodesia in 1968 and an arms embargo against
South Africa in 1977. See UN SC Res 253, UN Doc S/RES/253 (1968), reprinted in 7 ILM 897
(1968); UN SC Res 388, UN Doc S/RES/388 (1976), reprinted in 15 ILM 720 (1976); UN SC Res
418, UN Doc S/RES/418 (1977), reprinted in 16 ILM 1548 (1977). See also UN SC Res 411, UN
Doc S/RES/411 (1977), reprinted in 16 ILM 1550 (1977).
35. See UN Charter at Art 51 (cited in note 28).
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short of armed force to give effect to its decisions. These may include
"complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea
... and other means of communication. . . ." Article 42, by contrast,
contemplates that the Council consider that Article 41 measures would
be inadequate to change the behavior of the offending nation. Measures
permitted under Article 42 include "demonstrations, blockade, and other
operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations."
Because Resolution 661 speaks in terms of "prevent[ion]" of imports and
exports, sales or supplying of commodities or products, and a financial
freeze, it contemplated only an economic embargo, permitted under Arti-
cle 41, and not a blockade, which is an act of war.3 6
Use of the term "decision" was also important. Under Charter Arti-
cles 25 and 48, U.N. members pledge that they will carry out decisions of
the Council. Thus, as contrasted with the hortatory language of Resolu-
tion 660, members were bound to carry out the Security Council's wishes
in Resolution 661 and those that followed. 37 Continuing from Resolu-
tion 660 through Resolution 678 of November 29, 1990, the Security
Council has declared that it remains "seized" of the crisis precipitated by
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.38 Indeed, Resolution 674 declares that the
Council has "decide[ed] to remain actively and permanently seized of the
matter until Kuwait has regained its independence and peace has been
restored in conformity with the relevant resolutions of the ...Coun-
cil." 39 Thus the Council has invoked, sub silentio, U.N. Charter Article
12(1):
While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or
situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the Gen-
eral Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that
dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests. 40
36. Comprehensive Mandatory Sanctions Imposed Against Iraq, 27 No 4 UN Chronicle 5, 6-7 (1990)
and Naval Blockade Endorsed, 27 No 4 UN Chronicle 17 (1990), among other analyses existing, erro-
neously reported that a blockade was instituted.
37. Despite the obligatory language of U.N. Charter, Arts 25 and 48 as applied to "decisions"
with respect to Resolution 661, Congress could decide in the future to force U.S. noncompliance with
superseding legislation. See, for example, Diggs v Shultz, 470 F 2d 461 (1972) (cert denied). There is a
presumption against invalidation of obligations in international agreements by later legislation. Com-
pare United States v Palestine Liberation Organization, 695 F Supp 1456 (SDNY 1988). The interna-
tional obligation of the United States would continue despite domestic abrogation by later
Congressional action; 1 Restatement (Third) § 115(1) Comments a and b, Reporters' Notes I and 2
(cited in note 11).
38. UN SC Res 667, UN Doc S/RES/667 (1990), reprinted in 29 ILM 1332-33 (1990). See also
note 2, 77-80 and accompanying text.
39. UN SC Res 674, 5 11, UN Doc S/RES/674 (1990), reprinted in I Dept St Dispatch 239, 240
(1990). UN SC Res 665, 5 5, UN Doc S/RES/665 (1990), reprinted in 29 ILM 1329, 1330. See
Kuwait's "Annexation" Declared Null and Void, 27 No 4 UN Chronicle 14 (1990).
40. UN Charter at Art 12(1) (cited in note 28).
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Thus there can be no use of the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950
("UFP"),41 adopted by the General Assembly when Soviet vetoes under
Charter Article 27(3) barred further Council action during the Korean
War. It was for this reason that the General Assembly agenda steering
committee properly refused to allow Iraq to bring the crisis before the
Assembly on November 9. Recently, however, the Assembly has been
considering, through its committees, a draft resolution condemning Iraqi
behavior that may fall outside Security Council-preempted issues.42
C. Interception, Air Embargo and the Hostages
Shortly after passage of Resolution 661, Iraq established a puppet
regime in Kuwait and then annexed it as Province 19, declaring that
Kuwaitis were now Iraqi citizens.43 Security Council Resolution 662 of
August 9, 1990, followed, declaring that the annexation was "null and
void" and calling on all nations, international organizations and special-
ized agencies to refrain from action that might be construed as an indirect
recognition of the annexation.44 This was consonant with the General
Assembly's Definition of Aggression Resolution, whose Article 3(a) de-
nounces annexation of territory by force as an act of aggression; Article
5(3) declares that "no territorial acquisition.., resulting from aggression
is or shall be recognized as lawful." 45 As noted above, these acts by Iraq
may have consequences after the conflict. 46
On August 9, 1990, the President issued Executive Orders 12724
and 12725, revoking Executive Orders 12722 and 12723 and citing Reso-
lution 661 plus the same U.S. law sources as in the August 2 orders.47 On
the same day, August 9, the President sent a War Powers Resolution no-
tice to Congress. 48 The day before, the first elements of U.S. troops, the
41. UN GA Res 377, UN Doc A/1481 (1950), reprinted in 45 Am J Intl L 1 (Supp 1951).
Practice after that war would tend to confirm use of the UFP process, despite Charter Art 24(l)'s
statement that the Security Council has "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security .... Jorge Castafieda, Legal Effects of United Nations Resolutions 81-116 (Columbia
U Press, 1969). See also Crisis in the Area of the Persian GQdf Casts Long Shadow Over Forty.Fifth Assem:
bly, 27 No 4 UN Chronicle 40, 43 (1990).
42. Paul Lewis, U.S. Envoy to U.N. on Center Stage, New York Times A:7 (November 10, 1990).
43. Kuwait's "Annexation", 27 No 4 UN Chronicle 14 (1990).
44. UN SC Res 662, UN Doc S/RES/662 (1990), reprinted in 29 ILM 1327, 1328 (1990).
45. UN GA Res 3314 (cited in note 30).
46. See notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
47. Compare Executive Orders 12722-23, (cited in note 26) with Executive Orders 12724-25, 55
Fed Reg 33089-92 (1990).
48. Letter of President Bush to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, August 9, 1990, 26
No 32 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 1225 (August 13, 1990), citing War Powers
Resolution, 50 USC § 1541-48 (1988). On November 16, the President advised Congress, pursuant
to the War Powers Resolution, that additional U.S. forces would be deployed to the region. Letter of
President Bush to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the
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82nd Airborne, had arrived in Saudi Arabia; as of January over 500,000
members of a multinational force and its equipment had been program-
med for duty in the Arabian Peninsula. Syria and Turkey stationed
troops along their borders with Iraq. The multinational force began in-
tercepting seaborne commerce to and from Iraq and Kuwait on August
16.49 On August 17, the United States published Special Warning No.
80, which stated in paragraphs 1 and 2:
1. In response to requests from the legitimate government of Kuwait
and in exercising the inherent right of collective self-defense recognized
under Art. 51 of the U.N. Charter, United States forces will, in cooper-
ation with regional and allied forces, conduct a maritime operation to
intercept the import and export of commodities and products to and
from Iraq and Kuwait that are prohibited by U.N. Security Council
Resolution 661.
2. Affected areas include the Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Tiran, and
other choke points, key ports, and oil pipeline terminals. Specifically,
Persian Gulf interception efforts will be concentrated in international
waters south of 27 degrees north latitude; Red Sea interception efforts
will be conducted in international waters north of 22 degrees north
latitude. 50
This NOTMAR warned that all merchantmen "perceived to be proceed-
ing to or from Iraqi or Kuwaiti ports, or transshipment points, and carry-
ing embargoed material.., will be intercepted and may be searched." 51 If
vessels were determined to be carrying embargoed goods to Iraq or Ku-
wait, they would not be allowed to proceed with transit and would face
the possibility of diversion to a port or anchorage for the mandated
search. This possibility was to be exercised if it was required for safe navi-
gation. The NOTMAR also provided:
Failure of a ship to proceed as directed [would] result in the use of the
minimum level of force necessary to ensure compliance.... Any ships,
including waterborne craft and armed merchant ships, or aircraft,
which threaten or interfere with U.S. forces engaged in enforcing this
maritime interception will be considered hostile. 52
Senate, November 16, 1990, 26 No 46 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docs 1834 (November 19,
1990).
49. Michael Kramer, Must this Mean War?, Time 14 (August 27, 1990) (US ed). The United
States and its coalition partners also reported deployments to the area to the Security Council, in
accordance with U.N. Charter, Articles 51 and 52. Vessels Intercepted 27 No 4 UN Chronicle 15
(1990). On August 22, 1990, the President called up'selected reservists and national guardsmen.
Executive Order 12727, 55 Fed Reg 35027 (1990). On November 13, their tours were extended by
Executive Order 12733, 55 Fed Reg 47837 (1990). On January 18, additional reservists were called up
by Executive Order 12743, 56 Fed Reg 2661 (1991).
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On August 25, Resolution 665 authorized these interceptions.5 3
Responding to Iraq's verbal and physical pressure on nations to close
their embassies and consulates, Iraq's denial of access of third-state na-
tionals to their consuls, and Iraq's refusal to allow third-state nationals to
leave Iraq and Kuwait, the Security Council passed Resolution 664 on
August 18, demanding an end to such tactics.54 Although it cited no
authority, the Council undoubtedly relied on the 1961 Vienna Conven-
tion on Diplomatic Relations,55 the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consu-
lar Relations,56 and the Fourth Geneva (Civilians) Convention, which
provides a qualified right of aliens' departure during armed conflict.5 7
Iraq is also a party to these conventions. 58 Later Council resolutions have
referred explicitly to norms contained in these conventions: Resolution
666, demanding that Iraq look to the safety and well-being of third-state
nationals; 59 Resolution 667, again demanding release of third-state na-
tionals; 60 Resolution 670, confirming applicability of the Fourth Conven-
tion to Kuwait, and reminding Iraq and individuals of liability for "grave
53. UN SC Res 665 (cited in note 39). Resolution 665 was adopted only after the Council
received reports of United States and other nations' implementing interception measures. Both Com
prehensive Mandatory Sanctions at 6-7 and Naval Blockade Endorsed at 17 (cited in note 36) erroneously
reported that a blockade was instituted. The Council acted under U.N. Charter, Article 41, not U.N.
Charter Article 42, which would have approved a blockade. See also Vessels Intercepted at 15 (cited in
note 49).
54. UN SC Res 664, UN Doc S/RES/664 (1990).
55. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, [19721 23 UST 3227, TIAS No 7502, 500
UNTS 95 (signed April 18, 1961; in force April 24, 1964).
56. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, [1970]i1 UST 77, TIAS No 6820, 596 UNTS
261 (signed April 24, 1963; in force March 19, 1967).
57. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Arts 4,
13-14, 35-36, 47-48 [1955] 6 UST 3516, 3520, 3526-28, 3540, 3548, TIAS No 3365, 75 UNTS 287,
290, 296-98, 310, 318 (signed August 12, 1949) ("Fourth Convention"). For further analysis, see Jean
S. Picter, 4 The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 45-51, 118-28, 232-42, 272-77 (Ronald Griffin
and C.W. Dumbleton trans) (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1958). Although there is a
general human rights norm permitting departure from any country, including one's own, this may be
curtailed during "time of public emergency," for example armed conflict and occupation, and pre-
sumably this exception would be claimed by Iraq if it has filed a statement of derogation. See Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Arts 4, 12, 999 UNTS, 171, 174, 176 (signed
December 16, 1966; in force March 23, 1976). Iraq, but not the United States, is a party to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited
with the Secretary-General as of 31 December 1989, UN Doc ST/LEG/SER.E/134 (1990).
58. Department of State, Office of the Legal Advisor, Treaties in Force 296, 307, 370 (US Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 1990).
59. UN SC Res 666, 5 2, UN Doc S/RES/666 (1990), reprinted in 29 ILM 1330-31 (1990)
("international humanitarian law including, where applicable, the Fourth Geneva Convention"). See
Council Acts on Hunger and Suffering, 27 No 4 UN Chronicle XVIII (1990), for a summary of the
Council debate.
60. UN SC Res 667, 5 3 (cited in note 38) ("Vienna Conventions on diplomatic and consular
relations and international law"). See Diplomats Must Be Protected 27 No 4 UN Chronicle 19 (1990)
for a summary of the Council debate.
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breaches" of the conventions; 61 Resolution 674, adding violations of the
U.N. Charter, the conventions and international law. Resolution 674
also reminded Iraq of its liability under international law "for any loss,
damage or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third states, and their
nationals and corporations, as a result of the invasion and illegal occupa-
tion of Kuwait... ." and invited states to collect data "for restitution or
financial compensation by Iraq.... " 62 Later resolutions, such as Resolu-
tion 678's force authorization, incorporated the earlier ones by refer-
ence. 63 Although Iraq initially had declared that alien nationals of some
coalition states (for example the United Kingdom and the United States)
would be held as human shields while other states' nationals were free to
depart, eventually all alien nationals were allowed to leave.64 The remain-
ing diplomatic and consular staffs in Kuwait closed their doors and de-
parted through Baghdad. Coalition force embassy staffs in Iraq first were
reduced and then left Baghdad just before January 15. Iraqi embassies in
coalition force capitals remained open, albeit with reduced staffs. 65
Resolution 666 of September 13, besides reiterating applicability of
the Fourth Convention, also requested that the Secretary-General "seek
urgently, and on a continuing basis, information" 66 from United Nations
and other humanitarian agencies on availability of food in Iraq and Ku-
wait, particularly for children, expectant mothers, and the sick and eld-
erly. The Security Council, acting through a committee of the whole,
would receive reports on such categories and would decide on exemptions
for humanitarian purposes. These reports would be provided through
International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") or other humanita-
rian agency auspices. Medical supplies are also exempted from the Reso-
lution 661 embargo if they are for civilians.67 In a similar vein, Resolution
669 of September 24, in accordance with Article 50 of the Charter, ap-
61. UN SC Res 670, 1 13, UN Doc S/RES/670 (1990), reprinted in 29 ILM 1334, 1336 (1990).
62. UN SC Res 674, 15 1, 8-9 at 240 (cited in note 39) (violations of the U.N. Charter, Diplo-
matic and Consular Conventions, Fourth Convention and international law).
63. UN SC Res 678, UN Doc S/RES/678 (1990), reprinted in Dept State Dispatch 298 (1990).
See also UN SC Res 677, UN Doc S/RES/677 (1990), reprinted in I Dept State Dispatch 298 (1990).
64. The International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") tried to intercede with Iraq on
these issues, with no success, except to obtain release of Iranian prisoners of war remaining in Iraq
after the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war. Iran/Iraq: More than 70,000 POWs Repatriated; Jordan: Joint Opera-
tion, No 177 ICRC Bull 1, (October 1990); see also Gulf Crisis: ICRC Proposals Turned Down, No 177
ICRC Bull 2, 4 (October 1990); Middle East: Major Operational Challenge for ICRC and Gulf Crisis:
ICRC Response, No 176 ICRC Bull I (September 1990); Half a Million Stranded in the Sand, 27 No 4
UN Chronicle 8 (December 1990).
65. Patrick E. Tyler, Foreign Envoys Leave Baghdad As Fear Grows, New York Times A:I I (January
11, 1991); Iraqi Ambassador to Quit Britain, New York Times A: I (January 25, 1991); Bonn Orders 28
Iraqis Out, New York Times A: 11 (January 25, 1991).
66. UN SC Res 666 at 1331 (cited in note 59).
67. Council Acts on Hunger and Suffering, 27 No 4 UN Chronicle 18-19 (1990).
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proved assistance for states hurt by the embargo, such as Jordan. This
Resolution allowed a state so affected to consult with the Security Council
if "confronted with special economic problems arising from" carrying out
Council decisions.68 As a major trading partner, Jordan had received
much of its petroleum from Iraq. Jordan also had borne the brunt of the
refugee exodus from Iraq. 69
As noted above, Resolution 670 of September 25 imposed an air
embargo analogous to Resolution 661's land and sea embargo. Rather
than allowing interception of aircraft, as permitted by Resolution 665 for
vessels, Resolution 670 established control over aircraft through a require-
ment for denial of takeoff and overflight rights and through states' con-
trol of domestic carriers. Food and medical supplies for humanitarian
purposes were exempted but remained subject to Council control. Be-
sides the Fourth Geneva Convention, Resolution 670 cited the 1944 Chi-
cago Convention on International Civil Aviation as well as "international
law." 70 The Chicago Convention, not applicable to military or other
state aircraft, declares that nations may allow civil aviation overflights or
landings subject to agreements. 71 Although the United States did not
have a formal agreement with Iraq, its arrangement with neighboring Jor-
dan is typical.72 Such arrangements with Iraq or Kuwait were suspended
by Resolution 670, which specifically cited the "trumping provision," Ar-
ticle 103 of the Charter, which declares that Charter obligations prevail
over obligations under other international agreements, including bilateral
air transport treaties.73 Resolution 670 also reaffirmed applicability of the
Fourth Geneva Convention to Kuwait and that Iraq was bound to comply
fully with its terms "and in particular is liable.., in respect of the grave
breaches committed by it, as are individuals who commit or order the
68. UN SC Res 669, UN Doc S/RES/669 (1990), reprinted in 29 ILM 1333 (1990). Jordan was
not alone; eight other states requested consultations under U.N. Charter, Art 50. Sanctions: 106
Countries Reply (cited in note 26). See also To Alleviate Economic Hardship, 27 No 4 UN Chronicle 20
(1990) for a summary of Council debate on Resolution 669.
69. See notes 64 and 68.
70. Compare UN SC Res 661 (cited in note 26) and UN SC Res 665 at 1330 (cited in note 39)
with UN SC Res 670 at 1335 (cited in note 61) citing, inter alia, Convention on International Civil
Aviation, 61 Stat 1180, TIAS No 1591, 15 UNTS 295 (signed December 7, 1944; in force April 4,
1944) ("Chicago Convention"). Like all nations, the United States has procedures for registering and
regulating aircraft in international flights. See Federal Aviation Act, 49 USC App SS 1401-06, 1508-
10, 1515-15a, 1521-23 (1988).
71. Chicago Convention at Arts 3, 5-16 (cited in note 70).
72. Air Transport Agreement [Jordan-United States] [1979-1980] 32 UST 2652, TIAS No 9868
(signed February 21, 1980; in force June 8, 1980).
73. See also note 27.
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commission of grave breaches." 74 The Fourth Convention defines "grave
breaches" thus:
Grave breaches.., shall be those involving any of the following acts, if
committed against persons or property protected by the present Con-
vention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biolog-
ical experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to
body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confine-
ment of a protected person, compelling a protected person to serve in
the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person of
the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the present Convention,
taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of prop-
erty, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly. 75
As a party to the Convention, Iraq cannot absolve itself from these
violations. 76
D. Resolution 678, Authorizing Force
On November 29, Resolution 678 authorized U.N. members cooper-
ating with Kuwait "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement
[Resolution 660] and all subsequent resolutions and to restore interna-
tional peace and security in the area," unless Iraq used its "one final op-
portunity, as a pause of goodwill," to comply with the Council's
resolutions, on or before January 15, 1991. 77 By incorporating through
reference all previous resolutions, Resolution 678 provides that the use of
force in self-defense, as affirmed in Resolution 661, remains as a Council-
approved option. However, January 15, 1991, was not an ultimatum
deadline as contemplated by the 1907 Hague Convention (1I1) Relative to
74. UN SC Res 670, 13 at 1336 (cited in note 61). For a summary of the Security Council
debate on the resolution, see More Sanctions Imposed, 27 No 4 UN Chronicle 21 (1990).
75. Fourth Convention at Art 147 (cited in note 57). For further analysis, see Pictet, 4 The
Geneva Convention at 596-603 (cited in note 57) noting similar provisions in the other three Geneva
Conventions relating to armed conflict.
76. Fourth Convention at Art 148 (cited in note 57). On January 17, when fighting erupted, the
ICRC President "solemnly reminded States of their obligation to apply... international humanita-
rian law [including the Fourth Convention's protections for civilians] which they had undertaken to
respect." Jean de Courten, The Middle East Conflict: Position of the ICRC, No 181 ICRC Bull 1
(February 1991).
77. UN SC Res 678 (cited in note 63). UN SC Res 677 (cited in note 63) had been passed the
day before, condemning Iraqi attempts to alter the Kuwaiti population's demographic composition
and directing the Secretary-General to maintain a Kuwait-certified copy of the population register.
UN SC Res 662 (cited in note 44) had condemned Iraqi declarations that Kuwait was now part of
Iraqi territory; UN SC Res 677 was passed after Kuwaiti insurgents succeeded in smuggling a copy of
the register out, along with records of securities and other assets. Although the Kuwait government
was in exile in Saudi Arabia, its economic policy was executed in London. Kramer, Toward a New
Kuwait at 28-29 (cited in note 14).
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the Opening of Hostilities, 78 as described for World War I so vividly in
Barbara Tuchman's The Guns of August. 79 Resolution 678 did, however,
reaffirm Resolutions 660 and 662, the Council's initial directive to Iraq to
vacate Kuwait and its condemnation of the annexation of Kuwait; Resolu-
tions 661, 665, 666, 669 and 670, concerning ship interception, the air
embargo, and an affirmation of the inherent right of individual and col-
lective self-defense; 664, 667 and 674, dealing with hostages and the diplo-
matic and consular missions.80
This is how matters stood as of January 15, 1991, as to decisions
taken by the Security Council pursuant to its authority under Article 48
of the Charter, which obliges nations to obey such decisions.81 The
dozen resolutions, described on a chronological basis, raised peripheral
legal issues, some nearly moot with the beginning of Operation Desert
Storm, and some with potential vitality for the future.
m. ISSUES ON THE PERIPHERY OF
THE COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS
Besides those issues immediately tied to the Security Council resolu-
tions, for example, violations of diplomatic and consular immunity, tak-
ing hostages, violation of other humanitarian and human rights norms,
ship interceptions, and the air embargo, the Council's decisions involved
four other questions: self-defense, including anticipatory self-defense; the
role of the Secretary-General; conflict management as contemplated by
the Charter; and the possible role of the International Court of Justice.
A. Self-Defense Under the Charter and the Security Council
Resolutions
Article 2 of the U.N. Charter declares that U.N. Members "shall act
in accordance with the following Principles." Article 2 declares:
78. Hague Convention (III) Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, Arts 1-2, 36 Stat 2259, 2271
(signed October 18, 1907; in force February 28, 1910). Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are not parties
to this convention, whose Article 3 states that the convention can only be invoked as among parties;
the United States as a party to the convention would not, therefore, be bound under the conven-
tion's terms in its relations with these countries.
79. Barbara W. Tuchman, The Guns of August 91-157 (Dell Pub, 1962). However, Tuchman's
description of the frantic last-minute diplomatic maneuvering has been echoed in the Kuwait crisis
and war as deadlines approached. See note I I 1 and accompanying text.
80. UN SC Res 678 (cited in note 63). Both the North Atlantic Council of NATO and the
European Community expressed firm support for Resolution 678 in December, a month before De-
sert Storm. North Atlantic Council Statement on the Gulf, December 17, 1990; Final Remarks from
the European Community Summit Meeting, December 16, 1990, 1 Dept State Dispatch 354-55
(1990).
81. UN Charter at Art 48 (cited in note 28).
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1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign
equality of all its Members.
2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and
benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obliga-
tions assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peace-
ful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and
justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the purposes of the United Nations.
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in
any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall
refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Na-
tions is taking preventive or enforcement action.
6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Mem-
bers of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so
far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and
security.
7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially the domes-
tic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such
matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall
not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter
VII. 82
Article 51, part of Chapter VII, recites:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of indi-
vidual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Meas-
ures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall
be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any
way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council
under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security.8 3
Article 52(1) allows "regional arrangements" for dealing with the mainte-
nance of international peace and security, provided that they are consis-
tent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, stated in
Charter Articles 1 and 2. The Council may use such regional arrange-
ments as enforcement measures, but no enforcement may be taken with-
out the Council's authorization, and the Council must be informed of
82. Id at Art 2.
83. Id at Art 51.
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activities undertaken or contemplated by such regional agencies, accord-
ing to Articles 53(1) and 54.84
Resolution 660 of August 2 invoked Charter Articles 39 and 40:85
ARTICLE 39
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recom-
mendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with
Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security.
ARTICLE 40
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Coun-
cil may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the
measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to
comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desira-
ble. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights,
claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall
duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional
measures.
86
Thus between August 2 and August 6, when the first set of the Cheney
self-defense agreements were in place, there was no "decision," by which
U.N. members would be bound under Articles 25 or 48 of the Charter, to
govern states' actions with respect to the crisis. The Council only "de-
cided" under Resolution 660 to meet again to discuss the issue, thus sub
silentio invoking Article 12(1) of the Charter to bar General Assembly
action.8 7 No affirmative obligations on U.N. Members, other than Iraq
and Kuwait, were at issue. The preamble and paragraph 9 of Resolution
661, passed August 6, affirmed "the inherent right of individual or collec-
tive self-defense, in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait in
accordance with Article 51 of the Charter," and allowed assistance to
84. Id at Art 52(1).
85. UN SC Res 660 (cited in note 25).
86. UN Charter at Arts 39-40 (cited in note 28).
87. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Merits, Judgment (Nicaragua v US),
1986 ICJ 14, 392, 431-34 ("Nicaragua Case") found that the International Court of Justice ("ICJ")
had competence alongside the Security Council under UN Charter, Article 24, which gives the
Council "primary responsibility" for maintaining international peace and security, citing Case Con.
cerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (Judgment) (US v Iran) 1980 ICJ 3, 21-22
("Iran Hostages Case") which said that a matter falling under UN Charter, Article 36 could be heard
by the ICJ at the same time the Security Council is exercising authority. These cases are not relevant
in this dispute because no one has petitioned the court for redress. The Council has been proceeding
under U.N. Charter, Chapter VII (action with respect to threats to-the peace, breaches of the peace,
and acts of aggression) not Chapter VI (pacific settlement of disputes). In any event, prior ICJ deci-
sions do not set precedents in the common-law sense. Statute of the International Court of Justice,
Arts 38(l), 59 [1945] 59 Star 1031, 1060, 1062, Treaty Ser No 993 (signed June 26, 1945; in force
October 24, 1945) ("ICJ Statute"). However, the Court's citation of the Iran Hostages Case in the
Nicaragua Case shows that the Court examines its prior decisions as secondary sources and as evi-
dence of practice. Resort to the ICJ is a possibility for some aspects of the crisis. See notes 104-12
and accompanying text.
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Kuwait.88 Significantly, Resolution 661 invoked all of Chapter VII of the
Charter, whose Article 41 contemplates decisions on use of armed forces
to give effect to its "decisions" and calls upon U.N. members to apply
measures such as "interruption of economic relations, such as the embar-
goes and interdiction directed by Resolutions 661, 665 and 670.89
The United States' August 2, 1990, Executive Orders,90 which uti-
lized national law to freeze Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets located within the
United States, can be seen as either retorsions (unfriendly but legal re-
sponses under international law) or reprisals (legal only if in proportion
and in response to Iraq's preliminary act in violation of international law)
designed to force Iraq's return to legality. 9'
The August 9, 1990, Executive Orders, by invoking Resolution 661,
must be seen as the United States' attempt to implement its Charter obli-
gations. Thus from August 2-6, when the Council took its first Chapter
VII decision, the collective security effort contemplated in the Cheney
agreements rested, legally speaking, on self-defense as found in Article 51
of the Charter. Resolution 661, not superseded as to its allowances for
self-defense and aid to Kuwait (which could include military assistance for
1
88. UN SC Res 661 at 1326 (cited in note 26).
89. Id; UN Charter, Chapter VII (cited in note 28).
90. See note 26 and accompanying text.
91. Case Concerning Air Service Agreement Between France and the United States (France v US), 18
UN Rep Intl Arb Awards 417, 443-46 (1978) ("Air Service Agreement Case"); I Restatement (Third)
§§ 203(2) at 84 (cited in note 11). For a pre-Charter example of the disproportionate use of force for
reprisals, see the report on the Naulilaa Incident, Green Hackworth, 6 Digest of International Law 154-
55 (US Government Printing Office, 1943), summarizing Responsibility of Germany for Damages Caused
in the Portuguese Colonies of South Africa (Germany v Portugal), 2 UN Rep Intl Arb Awards 1011
(Versailles Treaty Arb 1928). See also Iran Hostages Case (cited in note 87); Lassa L.H. Oppenheim, 1
International Law 345 (Hersh Lauterpacht, ed) (David McKay, 8th ed 1955). A clear example of retor-
sion against Iraq was when the other states limited the size of Iraq's foreign diplomatic delegation.
Iraq soon reciprocated these actions. Given media-reported pronouncements by Iraq that the U.N.
coalition has committed aggression against it, Iraq may assert a right of reprisal such as its massive oil
discharge. However, Iraq's actions may still be illegal under international law. See Protocol I Addi-
tional to the Geneva Conventions Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts, Arts 35(3) (signed June 8, 1977; in force December 7, 1978), reprinted in 56 ILM 1391,
1408-09, 1414 (1977). This is a relatively new principle and may not be part of customary law.
Michael Bothe, Karl Josef Partsch and Waldemar A. Solf, New Rules for Victims of Conflicts 286, 290-
291, 358, 369 (Martinus Nijhoff, 1982). Protocol I has the status of treaty law for several coalition
partners such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, but neither Iraq nor the United States are party to it.
International Committee of the Red Cross, 1989 Annual Report 120-23 (1990). See also Convention
on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques
[1979] 31 UST 333, TIAS No 9614 (signed December 10, 1979; in force October 5, 1978), which
forbids deliberate manipulation of natural processes (as opposed to artificial processes like drilling for
oil) to produce widespread, long-lasting or severe effects to destroy, damage or injure a party to the
convention. Kuwait is party to the Convention, but Iraq is not. UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea, Art 194 (2), UN Doc A/CONF 02/122 (signed December 10, 1982), reprinted in 21 ILM 1261,
1308 (1982), provides that states must take all measures necessary to ensure that their activities are
conducted so as not to cause pollution damage to other states and their environment.
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self-defense), reaffirmed the right of a collective security for self-defense.
Thus between August 6 and August 25, when Resolution 665 approved
seaborne interception, the interception effort of the United States and
other nations rested on the right of collective self-defense as articulated in
the agreements92 and affirmed in Resolution 661, and as established
rights of reprisal and retorsion under international law. After August 25,
the interception issue was governed by Resolutions 665, 666, 669 and
670. Resolution 678, the force authorization, again confirmed the Resolu-
tion 665, right to intercept, and the Resolution 661, Article 51 self-de-
fense right.93
1. Other Self-Defense Situations. The Council Resolutions did not
cover all situations. For example, if Iraq had moved against Saudi Arabia,
the Resolutions would not have applied; the Cheney agreements would
have applied as Saudi Arabia's right of self-defense under Article 51 of
the Charter. Similarly, an Iraqi attack on Turkey would have triggered
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") Agreement, which
provides for collective self-defense by all NATO nations if there is an
attack on a NATO member. 94 Media reports indicated that NATO air-
craft were sent to Turkey to bolster that right.
92. UN SC Res 661 (cited in note 26); UN SC Res 665 (cited in note 39). Given the Cheney
agreements, the legal regime for the crisis at this point is reminiscent of the Cuban Missile Crisis of
1962, although the analogy is not perfect. See Proclamation No 3504, 27 Fed Reg 232 (1962), imple-
menting Joint Resolution of October 3, 1962, Pub L No 87-733, 76 Stat 697; Abram Chayes, The
Cuban Missile Crisis (Oxford U Press, 1974); Robert A. Divine, The Cuban Missile Crisis (Quadrangle
Books, 1971); Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (W.W. Norton,
1969); Carl Christol and Charles Davis, Maritime Quarantine: The Naval Interdiction of Offensive Weap-
ons and Associated Material to Cuba, 1962, 57 Am J Intl L 525 (1963); Sally V. Mallison and W.
Thomas Mallison, A Survey of the International Law of Blockade, 102 No 2 US Naval Inst Proc 44
(1976); Brunson MacChesney, Some Comments on the "Quarantine" of Cuba, 57 Am J Intl L 592
(1963); McDevitt, The UN Charter and the Cuban Quarantine, 17 JAG J 71 (1963); Myres S. McDou-
gal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self.Defense, 57 Am J Intl L 597 (1963); Leonard C. Meeker,
Defensive Quarantine and the Law, 57 Am J Intl L 515 (1963); Covey Oliver, International Law and the
Quarantine of Cuba: A Hopeful Prescription for Legal Writing, 57 Am J Int L 373 (1963); John W. Robert-
sort Blockade to Quarantine, 17 JAG J 87 (1963); Quincy Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 Am J Intl
L 546 (1963). The U.N. Secretary-General argued, however, on August 16, 1990, that the unilateral
interceptions would violate international law. Paul Lewis, U.N. Chief Argues Blockade Is Hasty, New
York Times A:12 (August 17, 1990).
93. UN SC Res 661 (cited in note 26); UN SC Res 678 (cited in note 63); see also note 91 and
accompanying text.
94. North Atlantic Treaty, Art 6, 63 Stat 2241, 2244, TIAS No 1964, 34 UNTS 243, 246 (in
force April 4, 1949), as modified by Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece
and Turkey, Art 2, [1952] 3 UST 43, 44, TIAS No 2390, 126 UNTS 350 (signed October 17, 1951; in
force February 15, 1952).
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Coalition force ships on the high seas also could have exercised self-
defense rights.95 It would seem, then, that the United States and other
parties to the force would be free to exercise individual or collective self-
defense rights under Article 51 in the face of an Iraqi-sponsored attack on
neighboring nations in the coalition.
Iraq launched indiscriminately-fired Scud missile attacks against
Israel. Some of these Scuds struck population centers, a clear violation of
Article 2(4) of the Charter. Israel is not a member of the coalition ar-
rayed against Iraq, although Israel is a U.N. member and, therefore, is
subject to Security Council resolutions like all other members. The Char-
ter is not a mutual defense pact like the NATO Agreement; however,
Article 51 affirms Israel's right to respond in self-defense. Israel might
choose retorsions or reprisals, although these options are limited under
international law. 96
2. Anticipatory Self-Defense. Besides the traditional and better-
known "reactive" form of self-defense, the multinational force might face
events calling for anticipatory self-defense, individually or as a group. The
doctrine has its origins in the Caroline case of 1837, in which British naval
forces attacked U.S. citizens aboard the Caroline in the Niagara River (the
U.S. citizens were aiding rebellion in Canada). Great Britain asserted
that the Caroline's destruction was an act of self-defense. By 1842, the
United States and Great Britain had agreed that such a right, involving
destruction of the source of an opponent's armed force before the shell or
bullet is on the way, was proper under international law. United States
Secretary of State Daniel Webster confirmed in a letter to the British am-
bassador that there were limitations to the doctrine: "[u]ndoubtedly it is
just, that, while it is admitted that exceptions growing out of the great law
of self-defense do exist, those exceptions should be confined to cases in
which the 'necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and
leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.' "9 The
response also must be proportional.
Since then, arguments have continued concerning availability of the
doctrine and its scope in an age of radar-directed weapons, long-range
supersonic missiles, and weapons of indiscriminate mass destruction such
95. Special Warning No 80 of August 17, 1990 and succeeding NOTMARs asserted "the inher-
ent right of collective self-defense." See note 50 and accompanying text.
96. See note 91 and accompanying text.
97. Letter of U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster to U.K. Ambassador Lord Alexander B.
Ashburton, August 6, 1842, John Basset Moore, 2 Digest of International Law 411-12 (US Government
Printing Office, 1906); the letter from Daniel Webster to U.K. Minister, Henry S. Fox, April 24,
1841, in Kenneth E. Shewmaker, ed, 1 The Papers of Daniel Webster: Diplomatic Papers 58, 67 (U Press
of New England, 1983).
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as gas or biological warfare devices. Many commentators believe that an-
ticipatory self-defense is still legally available, at least in the context of
individual nations, and perhaps in the context of collective self-defense as
well. 98
Today the issue is moot, given the attack by the U.N. coalition of
forces against Iraq and subsequent missile attacks by Iraq against Israel.
However, the issue could have reopened if Iraq had threatened the attack
capability of other nations not members of the coalition, such as Iran or
Jordan, and the victim state had the capability to deliver an anticipatory
response.
3. Unilateral Action. The United States or the multinational force
could not have attempted to solve the Kuwait crisis by unilateral invasion
of Kuwait or Iraq; in the absence of a claim of self-defense or Security
Council authorization, Article 2(4) forbids such action, and the 1974
General Assembly Resolution 3314 specifies such unilateral actions as ag-
gression.99 Iraq has identified the January 17 attack as an act of aggres-
sion, and undoubtedly would have asserted that such an attack,
unsupported by any claim of Council authorization or of self-defense,
would also have been aggression. Even if the Cheney agreements pro-
vided for this kind of action, they would be unenforceable under Articles
52(1), 53(1) and 103 of the Charter, which repeat the supremacy of Char-
ter norms over other treaties. 1°°
However, and this is an important caveat, if United States or coali-
tion forces had taken action, or if a state not part of the coalition (for
example Israel or Jordan) had acted in self-defense under Article 51, then
both the Charter and Security Council Resolutions such as 661, decided
pursuant to the Charter, would have affirmed their right to unilateral
action. For example, if the Cheney agreements provided for collective
self-defense among Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United States and Persian
Gulf nations, as they probably did, then Article 51 would have given
these nations the right to proceed with self-defense measures against Iraq
and Iraqi-held Kuwait, including anticipatory self-defense. 10 Technically
98. Anthony D'Amato, Israel's Air Strike upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor, 77 Am J Intl L 584 (1983)
summarizes views of some commentators. See Bowett, Self-Defense at 58-60, 142-44, 189 (cited in note
32), arguing that anticipatory self-defense continues under the Charter as before. For an opposing
view, see also the Nicaragua Case (cited in note 87), and Brownlie, International Law and the Use of
Force at 250-80 (cited in note 32). See also Note, Interference with Non-National Ships on the High Seas:
Peacetime Exceptions to the Exclusivity Rule of Flag-State Jurisdiction, 22 Vand J Transnatl L 1161, 1206-22
(1989), which summarizes high seas incidents; George Bunn, International Law and the Use of Force in
Peacetime: Do US Ships Have to Take the First Hit?, 39 No 3 Naval War Coll Rev 70 (1986).
99. See notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
100. UN Charter Arts at 52(1), 53(1) (cited in note 28); see notes 27, 73 and accompanying text.
101. See notes 97-98 for sources on anticipatory self-defense.
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this right remained available after the January 15 deadline; nothing in
Resolution 678 on the use of force limited it. Any other use of force after
January 15 would have been authorized under both Resolution 678,
which generally invokes Chapter VII, and Article 51 within Chapter
NM.102
One might argue that the 1986 case of Military and Paramilitary Activ-
ities in and against Nicaragua ("The Nicaragua Case") in the International
Court of Justice, which declared that collective in-country operations in
Nicaragua were an illegal response to actions that did not constitute an
armed attack, 0 3 applies to the Kuwait Crisis. The Nicaragua Case does
not apply for three reasons: (1) it was concerned with Article 15 and 36
issues, the latter being part of Chapter VI of the Charter, and the Kuwait
crisis has been under Chapter VII; (2) the Security Council has repeatedly
affirmed the right of self-defense; (3) cases such as this, in any event, can-
not operate as precedent in the common-law sense. 10 4
B. The Role of the U.N. Secretary-General
The U.N. Secretary-General, identified by Charter Articles 97 and
98 as the chief administrative officer of the United Nations and with such
other functions entrusted to him by the Council, has been an active
player since the passage of paragraph ten of Resolution 661 of August 6.
This Resolution requested him to report on the progress in implementing
the embargo, the first report being due in thirty days.' 05
The Council also asked him to report, in Resolution 664, on Iraq's
compliance with the Council's demand that nationals of third states be
allowed to depart. 10 6 Resolution 666 asked him to use his good offices in
facilitating delivery and distribution of food to Kuwait and Iraq.1°7 Reso-
lution 670 of September 25 welcomed the Secretary-General's use of good
offices to advance a peaceful solution;108 the same statement came in para-
graph twelve of Resolution 674 of October 29.109 Resolution 677 asked
him to take custody of the Kuwaiti population register."10 And since the
force Resolution 678 of November 29 incorporated by reference all of
102. UN SC Res 678 (cited in note 63).
103. See Nicaragua Case (cited in note 87).
104. See note 87.
105. UN SC Res 661 at 1327 (cited in note 26).
106. UN SC Res 664 (cited in note 54).
107. UN SC Res 666, 1 7 (cited in note 59).
108. UN SC Res 670 (cited in note 61).
109. UN SC Res 674 (cited in note 39).
110. UN SC Res 677 (cited in note 63).
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these, he had clear authority to make the "last-ditch" effort to avert war
by visiting Baghdad just before January 15.111
The plain language of the resolutions cannot, of course, tell the
whole story. For example, Charter Article 99 allows the Secretary-Gen-
eral to bring to the Council's attention "any matter which in his opinion
may threaten maintenance of international peace and security;" 112 un-
doubtedly he has used this authority. The resolutions cannot describe the
efficiency or thoroughness of the planning process, particularly the mili-
tary planning process which has been used for forty-five years.' 13 Acting
under the Uniting For Peace Resolution ("UFP"), the General Assembly
has charged the Secretary-General with peacekeeping force organization
and management in the past. 114 Such a charge from the Assembly does
not appear likely in this conflict. However, there could be a move in that
direction later, perhaps in connection with a restoration of order in the
area.
C. Conflict Management Under the Charter and the Agency
Principle
The only conflict management device mentioned in the Charter,
aside from the Security Council itself, is the Military Staff Committee
("MSC"), consisting of the chiefs of staff of the permanent members of
the Council plus an invited member representative, when that member's
participation is required. 115 Among other tasks, the MSC advises and
assists the Council on all questions relating to the Council's military re-
quirements for maintaining peace and security, in addition to employing
and commanding forces placed at the disposal of the Council. Article 46
of the Charter charges the Council with planning for application of
armed force with the assistance of the MSC. From the inception of the
United Nations, the Charter contemplated Council and MSC coopera-
tion in maintaining peace and security. Nevertheless, the MSC
111. UN SC Res 678 (cited in note 63). See also Lisa Beyer, Last Gasps on the Negotiation Trail,
Time 30 (January 21, 1991) (US ed). For the prior week's efforts, see Lisa Beyer, Last Chance to Talk
Time 15 (January 14, 1991) (US ed).
112. UN Charter at Art 99 (cited in note 28).
113. See notes 110-111 and accompanying text.
114. See generally Rosalyn Higgins, 1-4 United Nations Peacekeeping (Oxford U Press, 1970);
United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping, ISBN: 92-1 100275-
3, UN Sales No E 85 1 18 (1985). U.N. peacekeeping forces were at work in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon
even as the Kuwait crisis unfolded next door. See UNIIMOG Mandate Reversed, Troop Withdrawals
Welcomed, 27 No 4 UN Chronicle 23 (1990); UNIFIL Mandate Extended Until 31 January 1991, 27 No
4 UN Chronicle 24 (1990).
115. UN Charter at Art 47 (cited in note 28).
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atrophied, a victim of the Cold War.116 However, the recent citation to
the Military Staff Committee in Resolution 665 may indicate a renewal of
interest in the MSC, which reflects the Soviet change of position in re-
cent years with respect to U.N. participation.": 7 However, there has been
little indication of further employment of the MSC. The United States
and other nations may be concerned about efficiency of command and
control through the MSC, particularly in view of the fact that the MSC
has not been an operational agency and may be inefficient simply because
of disuse.
Thus far the Security Council has operated as a committee of the
whole, at least since Resolution 661 established the Committee of the
Security Council, informally known as the Sanctions Committee, with
stated responsibilities: to examine the Secretary-General's reports com-
missioned by the Council; to seek information from other states regarding
action taken by them concerning implementation of provisions of Coun-
cil resolutions; and to meet and consider what shipments should pass to
Iraq under the exceptions for humanitarian aid.118
Prior incidents of the Security Council's commanding military action
have followed an agency principle. For the Korean War, Council Resolu-
tion 84 requested that the United States appoint the commander of a
unified command to which all members were to provide assistance, in-
cluding forces. 119 Additionally, when the Security Council decided to
condemn Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence, it charged
the United Kingdom as the adrhinistering power for suppressing the re-
bellion in 1965.120 A separate resolution in 1966 called upon Portugal to
bar oil shipments from Beira to Rhodesia and the United Kingdom to
prevent "by the use of force if necessary the arrival at Beira of vessels
reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Rhodesia."' 121
116. Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, Charter of the United Nations at 329-33 (cited in note 21);
Moynihan, On the Law of Nations at 112-13 (cited in note 10). Michael Mandelbaum, The Bush Foreign
Policy, 70 Foreign Affairs 5, 11 (1991).
117. Moynihan at 97-99 (cited in note 10); UN SC Res 665, 5 5, (cited in note 39).
118. UN SC Res 661, 3 6, at 1327 (cited in note 26); see also UN SC Res 666, 5 1, 3, 5-6 at 1331
(cited in note 59); UN SC Res 669 (cited in note 68); UN SC Res 670, 33 3-4, 6, 9 at 1335-36 (cited in
61).
119. UN SC Res 84, UN Doc S/RES/84 (1950), reprinted in Karel C. Wellers, ed, Resolution and
Statements of the United Nations Security Council (1946-1989) 253 (Dordrecht, 1990). See also Edwin C.
Hoyt, The United States Reaction to the Korean Attack: A Study of the Principles of the United Nations
Charter as a Factor in American Policy-Making, 55 Am J Intl L 45 (1961); Josef L. Kunz, Legality of the
Security Council Resolutions of June 25 and June 27, 1950, 45 Am J Intl L 137 (1951).
120. See UN SC Res 216 and 217, reprinted in 5 ILM 167-68, (1966). For the result, see Cable,
Gunboat Diplomacy at 123-26 (cited in note 24); Daniel P. O'Connell, The Influence of Law on Sea
Power 137-38, 174-75 (Manchester U Press, 1975). Two years later the Council approved an eco-
nomic embargo against Rhodesia, an "illegal racist minority regime." See note 34.
121. UN SC Res 221, reprinted in 5 ILM 534 (1966).
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In all cases, the Security Council had opted for the agency approach
in the crisis. Resolution 678 authorizes use of force by the multilateral
force. 122 If the crisis continues for some time, it is theoretically possible
for the 678 authority to be withdrawn and an MSC-controlled command
structure substituted. This result seems about as remote as the possibility
of a total Security Council withdrawal of the crisis from its agenda, and
instituting a General Assembly peacekeeping force such as the one operat-
ing in Lebanon today under Uniting for Peace principles. If Iraq had
withdrawn from Kuwait voluntarily or after use of force under Resolution
678, a peacekeeping force could remain under Security Council auspices,
with legal authority flowing from Chapters VI and VII of the Charter. 123
D. The Potential Role of the International Court of Justice
One tantalizing issue is whether the jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice could be invoked. Although Iraq has not accepted the
Court's compulsory jurisdiction under ICJ Statute Article 36(2), there is
the possibility of invoking Article 36(1), which provides for jurisdiction in
accordance with a treaty or by the parties' compromis. 124 The Optional
Protocols to the Diplomatic and Consular Conventions, breaches of
which have been claimed in the Council resolutions, provide for ICJ adju-
dication, with arbitration and conciliation as alternatives.125 Iraq is party
to both the conventions and the protocols. 126 There is the possibility of
invoking the Court's jurisdiction through a bilateral treaty, as happened
in the cases of U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Iran ("Iran Hostages")
and The Nicaragua Case, 127 but there is apparently no such consent by
Iraq to jurisdiction. The U.S.-Iraq commerce and navigation treaty, un-
like those with Iran and Nicaragua, has no such jurisdictional agree-
ment. 128 There has been no indication of any nation's proposal to litigate
122. UN SC Res 678 (cited in note 63).
123. See note 114 and accompanying text.
124. See UN SC Res 667, 5 3 at 1333 (cited in note 38); UN SC Res 674, 5 1 at 240 (cited in note
39); UN SC Res 678 at 298 (cited in note 63), referring to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (cited in note 56). ICJ Statute at Arts
36(1) and 36(2) (cited in note 87).
125. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations Concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Arts 1-3 [1972] 23 UST 3374-76, TIAS No 7502, 500 UNTS
241, 242-44 (signed April 18, 1961; in force June 24, 1964); Optional Protocol to the Convention on
Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Arts 1-3 [1970] 21 UST
325-27, TIAS No 6820, 596 UNTS 487, 488-90 (signed April 24, 1963; in force March 19, 1967).
126. US Dept of State, Treaties in Force at 287-88, 297-98 (cited in note 58).
127. Iran Hostages Case and Nicaragua Case (cited in note 87).
128. Compare Treaty of Commerce and Navigation [Iraq-United States] 54 Stat 1790, Treaty Ser
No 960, 203 LNTS 107 (signed December 3, 1938; in force May 20, 1940), with Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation [Nicaragua-United States], Art 24(2) [1958] 9 UST 449, 467, TIAS No
4024, 367 UNTS 3, 32 (signed January 21, 1956; May 24, 1958) and Treaty of Amity, Economic
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by ICJ compromis, or for the Security Council to seek an advisory opinion,
as it might under the Charter and the Statute.1 29
Nevertheless, these alternatives remain. If the conflict is drawn out,
and it settles into a sitzkrieg, or is concluded and settlement alternatives
are weighed, the options of resort to ICJ or alternate dispute mechanisms
may seem more attractive. 130 If a nation fails to abide by an ICJ decision,
the other nation may bring the matter before the Security Council for
recommendations or decision.' 31 Thus if ICJ adjudication were sought
and the Security Council defers further decision on some aspect of the
conflict, the Council would still be able to respond if the parties did not
abide by ICJ's decision.
III. CONCLUSION
"Never before in the 45-year history of the United Nations had the
Security Council 'reacted with such unanimity to an invasion, occupation
and purported annexation,' said Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuel-
lar."' 132 Although this statement generally has been true, the Security
Council's efforts during the early history of the Korean War and the re-
pression of Rhodesia's illegal regime serve as precedents for some degree
of unanimous action. 133 Nevertheless, the confrontation from August
through January demonstrates how the Charter planners envisioned the
functioning of enforcement measures against aggressors.134
Relations and Consular Rights [Iran-United States], Art 21(2) [1957] 8 UST 899, 913 TIAS No 3853,
284 UNTS 93, 134 (signed August 15, 1955; in force June 16, 1957). The Nicaragua-US treaty is no
longer in force, having been denounced in the course of the Nicaragua Case litigation (cited in note
87).
129. UN Charter at Art 96(1) (cited in note 28); ICJ Statute at Art 36(1) (cited in note 87).
130. See Nicaragua Case and Iran Hostages Case (cited in note 87). Moreover, the Court's prior
decisions have no precedential value in the common-law sense, except as between the litigants and the
adjudicated issue. ICJ Statute at Arts 38(1)(d), 59 (cited in note 87); see also I Restatement (Third) of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §S 102-103 (ALl, 1987) (cited in note 11); UN Char-
ter at Art 33 (cited in note 28). During the fall and winter of 1939-40, after German armies had
conquered Poland at the beginning of World War II, and a German peace offer had been rejected,
"[bly mid-January it was clear that both armies would remain dug in for the duration of the winter.
Impatient journalists seeking news began to complain of 'the phony war,' or of what some of them
called the new doctrine of sitzkrieg." Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total War 1939-1945 19 (Harper
& Row Pub, 1968). Germany had employed blitzkrieg ("lightning war") tactics in Poland, and Eng-
land later endured the "blitz." My thanks to Associate Professor, Michael L. Hughes, of the Wake
Forest University History Department, for research assistance on this source.
131. UN Charter at Arts 25, 36(1), 37(1), 38, 48, 94(2) (cited in note 28).
132. Comprehensive Mandatory Sanctions at 5 (cited in note 36).
133. See note 120 and accompanying text.
134. See Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, Charter of the United Nations (cited in note 21), and
Russell and Muther, A History of the United Nations Charter (cited in note 21).
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Nation-states have followed most principles in Chapter VII of the
Charter. 135 Indeed, the absence of any reference to the General Assem-
bly's Definition of Aggression and Friendly Relations resolutions, passed
by consensus during the height of the use of the UFP alternative, suggests
that the Council, for now freed of the veto impediment by great power
consensus, is seeking-to write its own law under the Charter.136 The Sec-
retary-General has been at work as the Council contemplates the duties of
his office within the context of the Charter. 137 The framework of collec-
tive security, from the venerable NATO agreement 138 to the Cheney
agreements concluded in August, 39 is in place. However, the Military
Staff Committee system, contemplated by Chapter VII, appears to have
been bypassed in favor of the agency approach employed during the Ko-
rean War and the debate over Rhodesia." 40 Other organizations like the
International Committee of the Red Cross have attempted to contribute
to resolving the confrontation.14 ' The World Court stands ready to play
its role in resolving issues arising out of the confrontation. 142 Principles
of reprisal, retorsion, and individual and collective self-defense, including
anticipatory self-defense, 143 lurk as hidden issues as the conflict has un-
folded on the sands of Saudi Arabia and on prime-time television the
world over. Now that war has come and apparently gone, another round
of issues, ranging from humanitarian law to conflict termination, will face
the nations of the international community. Thus far, the legal regime
contemplated by the Charter forty-five years ago has been employed rela-
tively effectively.
At the national levl, within the United States, the debate over sanc-
tions or force has closed, as has the issue of war-making authority under
the Constitution. 44  New questions of industrial mobilization, 145 in-
creased or decreased participation in the war, 146 war termination, and the
treatment of returning veterans 147 will confront the United States.
135. See notes 24-80 and accompanying text.
136. See notes 30-33.
137. See notes 105-14 and accompanying text.
138. See note 94 and accompanying text.
139. See notes 34, 92, 100 and accompanying text.
140. See notes 115, 119-21, 123 and accompanying text.
141. See note 64 and accompanying text.
142. See notes 124-31 and accompanying text.
143. See notes 85-98 and accompanying text.
144. See notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
145. Executive Order 12742, National Security Industrial Responsiveness, 56 Fed Reg 1079
(1991).
146. See note 15-18 and accompanying text.
147. Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 USC App §S 501-91 (1990).
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"[W]ar is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a
continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means....
The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means
can never be considered in isolation from their purpose."'148 Thus wrote
Carl von Clausewitz in the early nineteenth century.
The foregoing analysis has traced the legal aspects of military force
under the U.N. Charter and how it has developed in the crisis over Ku-
wait. However, as von Clausewitz would urge, there are other means of
economic and diplomatic pressure, even now ongoing, to achieve ideolog-
ical coercive and persuasive strategies. 149 As we have seen, unlike Cic-
ero's day when one might say, "Silent enim leges inter anna" (the laws are
inoperative in wartime),' 50 law follows nations and their armies as they
proceed to combat and then to settle accounts at the peace table.
Each nation, ranging from the most totalitarian like Iraq to the most
open societies like the United States, also must consult its domestic legal
system, as well as its domestic economic, moral and other values as part of
the calculus of crisis and conflict decision-making.
There are four final observations. First, debates within democracies
before and during war are not new; Thucydides reported them in the
course of the long Peloponnesian War of the fifth century B.C.151 Sec-
ond, a democracy should avoid disruption of the national social and polit-
ical fabric by a quick, effective conflict that minimally involves its civil
society.'52 Third, "[Wiar is hell," as General William Tecumseh Sherman
is supposed to have said. 153 Iraq's rape of Kuwait, indiscriminate attacks
148. Carl von Clausewitz, On War 87 (Michael Howard and Peter Paret, trans) (Princeton U
Press, 1976).
149. See the law-science-policy alternatives for strategies, in Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lass-
well and Lung-Chu Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order 135 (Yale U Press, 1980); Iesuke
Suzuki, The New Haven School of International Law: An Invitation to a Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence, I
Yale Studies in World Public Order 26-27 (1974); George K. Walker, Sea Power and the Law of the Sea:
The Need for a Contextual Approach, 7 Ocean Devel & Intl L 299, 311 (1979), 83 Mil L Rev 131, 155
(1979).
150. Cicero, Pro Milone 4.11 (N.H. Watts, trans) (G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1931).
151. Compare, for example, the addresses of Pericles with that of Alcibrades and the debate over
Mytilene. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 2.34-2.46, 2.59-2.65, 3.36-3.50, 6.15-6.19 (Rex
Warner, trans) (Penguin Books, 1972).
152. George K. Walker, Long and Short-Range Causes of The Pelopponesian War, in US Naval War
College Center for Continuing Education: Administrative Guide 34, 39 (March 1, 1984).
153. Attributed to General William Tecumseh Sherman. Sherman is reported to have said this
in a brief, impromptu address to 5000 Union Army veterans and others at Columbus, Ohio, on
August 11, 1880: "There is many a boy here today who looks upon war as all glory, but, boys, it is all
hell." It was later shortened to "War is hell." Sherman later forgot that he had ever said it, much as
the public almost immediately forgot the prepared address of President Rutherford B. Hayes, with
whom Sherman shared the podium. See generally Lloyd Lewis, Sherman: Fighting Prophet 635-37 (Har-
court, Brace and Co, 1958); James M. Merrill, William Tecumseh Sherman 379-80 (Rand McNally,
1974); see also Calley v Callaway, 382 F Supp 650, 711-12 (MD Ga 1974) (dictum), rev'd, 519 F2d 184
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on Israel and Saudi Arabia, and release of crude oil into the Persian Gulf
have demonstrated the truth of his statement. No true account of con-
flict is pleasant, and the prospect of trench warfare laced with chemical
attacks brings back revolting memories.154 As Stephen Crane illustrates
in The Red Badge of Courage, war brings out the best and worst.1 55
Fourth, there are other factors at play on the international plane; von
Clausewitz alluded to the "fog of war"' 56 that surrounds any military op-
erations. In 1815, Lord Byron wrote in The Destruction of Semnacherib of
the death of King Semnacherib's army in a single night.'57 Semnacherib
ruled Assyria, whose capital was Nineveh, now a ruin in today's Iraq. The
event of which Byron and the biblical chroniclers wrote was a major. de-
(5th Cir 1975), cert denied, 425 US 911 (1976). The same sort of elision occurred with respect to von
Clausewitz and the "fog of war" attribution. See note 156 and accompanying text. Edward Everett's
speech, like that of President Hayes, suffered the same fate of consignment to obscurity when Abra-
ham Lincoln delivered his Gettysburg Address in 1863.
154. Compare, Karnow, Vietnam (cited in note 9) with Erich Maria Remarque, All Quiet on the
Western Front (A. Wheen trans) (Grosset & Dunlap, 1929) (a classic novel set during World War I,
which depicts trench warfare from a German perspective). S.D. Landersman, Will Hussein Use Gas?,
117 No 2 US Naval Inst Proc 84 (1991), notes that not all gas casualties are fatal, and the percentages
of deaths from other weapons were higher in other conflicts.
155. See Stephen Crane, The Red Badge of Courage (Random House, 1951).
156. Lance Morrow, The Fog of War, Time 16, 18 (February 4, 1991) (US ed). The phrase is said
to have originated with Carl von Clausewitz at 117-121 (cited in note 148).
157. The Assyrian came down like the wolf on the fold,
And his cohorts were gleaming in purple and gold;
And the sheen of their spears was like stars on the sea,
When the blue wave rolls nightly on deep Galilee.
Like the leaves of the forest when summer is green,
That host with their banners at sunset were seen;
Like the leaves of the forest when autumn hath blown,
That host on the morrow lay wither'd and strown.
For the angel of death spread his wings on the blast,
And breathed in the face of the foe as he pass'd;
And the eyes of the sleepers wax'd deadly and chill,
And their hearts but once heaved, and for ever grew still.
And there lay the steed with his nostril all wide,
But through it there roll'd not the breath of his pride;
And the foam of his gasping lay white on the turf,
And cold as the spray of the rock-beating surf.
And there lay the rider distorted and pale,
With the dew on his brow and the rust on his mail:
And the tents were all silent, the banners alone,
The lances unlifted, the trumpet unblown.
And the widows of Ashur are loud in their wail
And the idols are broke in the temple of Baal;
And the night of the Gentile, lunsmote by the sword,
Hath melted like snow in the glance of the Lord!
George Gordon, Lord Byron, The Destruction of Semnacherib, Jerome McGann, Lord Byron: The Com-
plete Poetical Works 309-10 (Clarendon Press, 3d ed 1981). See also 2 Kings 18-19 and Isaiah 37:36-38.
I am indebted to my colleague, Emeritus Professor Hugh W. Divine, for suggesting The Destruction of
Semnacherib.
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feat (perhaps attributable to plague and not the angel of death), 5 8
although the Assyrian empire did flourish for a time thereafter. Never-
theless, Assyrian hegemony in the Middle East was brief, lasting only dur-
ing the seventh century B.C., and Assyria vanished as a world power as
quickly as it rose.' 59 Even as some have said that Iraq is a country that
supports an army, Assyria was "the first complete embodiment of the
power state on earth."' 60 Over 2500 years separate us from Semnacherib
and his hordes; other peoples have conquered or settled today's Iraq, and
a newer faith, Islam, is a major factor in the confrontation over Kuwait.
Even so, will history repeat itself in another precipitous decline of Iraq?
The response to these questions must be answered by the future, for
which international law can supply only a few pieces of the puzzle.
158. Albert A. Trever, 1 History of Ancient Civilization 97 (Harcourt, Brace and Co, 1936). Given
the loss of fresh water and sewage facilities in Baghdad and perhaps other Iraqi cities, the risk of
epidemic infectious disease such as cholera or typhoid has increased, and more lives could be lost
through this cause than on Desert Storm battlefields. In that respect, the mass death of
Semnacherib's army could be repeated in the wake of the Gulf War. In any event, the demise of
Saddam Hussein's vaunted army came almost as quickly as Semnacherib's.
159. H.W.F. Saggs, The Might that Was Assyria 85-121 (St Martin's Press, 1984). A remnant of
the Assyrians still live in modern Iraq. William M. Carley, How Iraq Attempted to Kill a Dissident in the
United States, Wall St J A:I (February 27, 1991).
160. Herman Bengston, History of Greece 44 (Edmund Bloedow, trans) (U of Ottawa Press, 1980);
see also Saggs, The Might at 243-68 (cited in note 159) and Trever, History of Ancient Civilization at 99
(cited in note 158). H.W.F. Sagg's description of the Assyrian army has striking parallels with the
Iraqi forces. Andrew Burn, The Lyric Age of Greece 100-6 (Minerva Press, 1967) illustrates the analo-
gous power politics, the role of sickness in decimating armies, and the rapid rise and fall of cultures, in
the Middle East during the seventh century B.C. I am indebted to Assistant Professor James Garry
DeVoto, of the Wake Forest University Classical Languages Department, for his suggestions on this
point.
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